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The technological landscape of today allows for almost instantaneous global 
circulation and retrieval of testimonial claims. Children and adults alike are 
increasingly faced with the task of evaluating claims’ reliability without an ability to 
assess the validity of the process by which that knowledge is acquired. Expectations 
of a standard of empirical practice may vary based on the identity of the informant 
and can thus guide to whom we ascribe epistemic trust. The current studies examine 
whether 4- to 7-year-old children extend expectations of others’ standard of empirical 
practice differentially to minimal group members. In both the Pilot (N=36) and Main 
Experiment (N=96), children were randomly assigned to one of two color groups. We 
tested whether children’s attributions of verification behaviors were informed by their 
preference for and perceived similarity to ingroup members. We found that children 
were just as likely to ascribe verified and unverified claims to ingroup members as 
they were to outgroup members. A number of possible explanations for this finding is 
discussed, laying groundwork for an important line of research studying the relation 
between children’s expectations of others’ standard of empirical practice and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
A great deal of what we know is based in what others tell us. Indeed, the 
technological landscape of today allows for testimony – information communicated 
by persons (e.g., McMyler, 2007)– to promulgate across the world at a staggering 
rate. To address the ever-increasing challenge of navigating the trustworthiness and 
validity of a nearly infinite number of sources, a pressing issue of the 21st century is 
to promote scientific literacy – an understanding of the scientific ways of knowing 
(Maienschein, 1999). Scientific literacy places an emphasis on thinking critically 
about our surrounding world, with an ultimate goal to produce skeptical and creative 
habits of mind (e.g., Nelson, 1999; Maienschein, 1999). Thus, although learning 
scientific facts and concepts from others is an efficient learning tool (e.g., Dawkins, 
1993), allowing one to acquire information that may otherwise be difficult to attain on 
their own, it also poses a challenge in that the receiver must trust that this information 
is accurate. This epistemological challenge is of particular importance for young 
children as they are especially reliant on information provided by others at a time 
during which they are still developing the cognitive skills required to critically 
evaluate encountered claims (Harris & Koenig, 2006).  
The scientific process does not unfold in a vacuum, and so by extension, 
scientific habits of mind must also be emphasized as critical for effectively learning 
from others – an inherently social process. The concepts of trust and trustworthiness 
have long been studied by philosophers and psychologists; one such perspective is 





Potter 2002). According to this view, trusting a claim to be true suggests the 
listener’s favorable disposition toward the speaker (Giffin, 1967). There are a 
number of possibilities for explaining a listener’s favorable disposition, however, 
and so the explanation is most often dependent on both the context in which a 
claim was made, and the domain of knowledge required for it to be credible.  
Highlighting the importance of the process by which an informant has 
acquired the knowledge they communicate to others, promotes early development 
of scientific habits of mind and in turn, supports young children’s ability to 
critically evaluate an empirical claim. However, the process is fundamentally 
connected to the individual performing it, leading us to the current study which 
investigates whether young children perceive some extent of social value in 
individuals’ choice to verify the information they plan to communicate to others. In 
the following sections, I provide a review of findings from current research which 
lends to the empirical questions at hand. 
First, I begin with a broad overview of a paradigm most recently utilized to 
determine how children distinguish reliable information sources from those that are 
not or less so. Following, I review how this process differs in terms of the content of 
the claim itself (i.e., the knowledge domain required), and based on the identity of the 
informant. Further, I analyze present research examining pre-school children’s 
evaluations of the empirical process and its relation to an informant’s perceived 
trustworthiness as a source. Subsequently, I discuss the current gap in the 
developmental literature, which this study aims to address. Lastly, I provide a general 





Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
2.1 Selective Trust in Testimony 
Recent research in developmental psychology has devoted a great deal of 
attention to children’s demonstration of selective trust – a term used to describe the 
ability to discern whom should be trusted from those who should not (e.g., Clement, 
2010; Harris & Corriveau, 2011; see Mills, 2013 for a detailed review). Although we 
tend to perceive young children as naïve and credulous, their selectivity suggests an 
early understanding that epistemic sources vary in their reliability; or said simply, that 
not all information is accurate. The typical paradigm used in this line of research 
involves introducing children to one or two informants, who will serve as the 
epistemic sources providing the claims that children are prompted to evaluate. This 
initial introduction is designed to provide background information, such as 
informants’ particular characteristics or behaviors that may be relevant when 
assessing the reliability of their testimony in later, novel tasks. In other words, such 
introductions are presented to assess whether children deem the observed 
characteristics or behaviors as an indication of whether or not an informant is likely to 
serve as a reliable source of information in future.  
Common variations of this initial phase in the paradigm include providing 
children with a description of the informants (e.g., “This person is a trickster”) or 
showing informants as consistently behaving in a particular way (e.g., establishing a 
history of accuracy or inaccuracy). Koenig, Clément, and Harris (2004), for example, 





label familiar objects (e.g., cup, ball, car), one informant as the consistently accurate 
labeler and the other the consistently inaccurate labeler. This particular study sought 
to examine whether an informant’s prior accuracy in labeling familiar objects guides 
children’s trust in their subsequent labeling of novel objects. Indeed, it did, suggesting 
that at least in the domain of word learning, young children infer a relationship 
between past and future accuracy.  
2.1.1 Semantic versus episodic knowledge domains. Much of this work on 
children’s selective trust is focused on children’s evaluations of claims that require 
some kind of semantic knowledge, particularly, object labeling such as in the Koenig 
et al. (2004) study discussed above. By evaluating “simple” types of semantic 
knowledge such as naming familiar objects, young children display an ability not 
only to monitor an informant’s track-record of accuracy but also to maintain and 
apply their understanding of person-specific differences in knowledge when deciding 
whom to trust (Brosseau-Liard & Birch, 2011). However, accuracy is not a 
disposition; no informant is all-knowing and always a reliable source of information 
in every domain.  
In situations where a presented claim requires a more specialized type of 
semantic knowledge (i.e., expertise), by four years of age, children consider the 
identity of the informant (e.g., doctors and car mechanics) in determining who is 
more likely to provide an accurate answer to a question (Lutz & Keil, 2002); 
although, they become better at this as their discipline-based knowledge becomes 
more fine-tuned with age and education (i.e., formal schooling; Danovitch & Keil, 





observable reality or “objectively accessible information”; Fedra & Schmidt, under 
review), there are certain cues to what an informant is likely to know that are specific 
to the situation at hand. Despite an astrophysicist’s expertise in gravity, they must 
have access to a telescope, for instance, in order to be a reliable epistemic source for 
knowing whether a particular bright spec in the sky is a star or the planet Venus.  
Testimony related to an observable reality therefore differs from object labels 
in the domain of knowledge asserted to the listener. A listener must therefore 
recognize the different processes required for obtaining such varying forms of 
knowledge and in turn, apply different strategies for determining the trustworthiness 
of encountered claims. Testimony related to an observable reality is an assertion of a 
speaker’s knowledge of objectively accessible information. Although objectively 
accessible, an appropriate form of perceptual access to an epistemic source is 
required to verify the specific content of a given claim. An informant must employ 
the necessary empirical methods to ensure that the information they later assert to 
others is in fact reliable. For example, although one may have some form of 
perceptual access to a given object such as an opportunity for visual inspection, 
seeing this object would not justify a claim about its texture (i.e., whether it is soft or 
hard); the appropriate form of perceptual access in this case would be the ability to 
touch or feel the object. It is whether or not the opportunity to perform this specific 
empirical process (i.e., touching or feeling the object) is seized by the informant that 
determines the reliability of their subsequent assertion of the object’s soft or hard 
texture. In other words, the trustworthiness of such claims depends on whether or not 





content. Engaging in this empirical process then serves as the means by which the 
informant acquires relevant episodic knowledge that substantiates their claim.  
2.1.2 Reliability of the informant and their empirical claim. Prior work has 
established that when evaluating the validity of empirical claims, it is only between 
three- to four-years of age that children develop and appropriately apply an 
epistemological understanding of the causal role that perception (i.e. informational 
access to an observable reality) plays in knowledge formation (Pratt & Bryant, 1990; 
Fedra & Schmidt, under review). However, given an informant’s access, a critical 
component to consider is whether prior to making an empirical claim, the informant 
chose to gather the necessary and appropriate supporting evidence. This is to say that 
the informant exercises agency when verifying that the information they plan to 
communicate to others is in fact accurate.  
There are myriad situations in which empirical claims must be evaluated 
without the possibility of assessing the validity of an informant’s process. In cases 
where the content of the claim itself is not directly verifiable, the listener can only 
utilize the identity of the informant themselves to reason about the reliability of their 
claim. Upon initial introductions to other individuals, social group membership is one 
of the most immediately available pieces of information. Depending on one’s social 
group membership–for instance, whether they are young or old, male or female, or 
speak the native language or a foreign language–we might form quick judgments and 
expectations about the individual, such as their food and music preferences, 
educational background, or with whom they affiliate. Despite the fact that an 





empirical claim they communicate is accurate, a listener’s trust may be influenced by 
a motivation to draw favorable characterizations of those whom they themselves 
affiliate (Billing & Tajfel, 1973).  
Indeed, in the absence of other information, young children privilege 
information from in-group members (Buttelmann et al., 2013; Chen et al. 2013; 
Elashi & Mills, 2014; MacDonald et al., 2013) and those perceived as similar to 
themselves (Reyes-Jaquez & Echols, 2013). Yet, around this same age, children also 
develop an understanding of the connection between one’s empirical process and the 
reliability of their claims (Butler, Gibbs, & Tavassolie, 2018; Butler, Schmidt, 
Tavassolie, & Gibbs, in revision), demonstrating a consistent preference for 
informants who fully verify their claims over those who do not or who do so 
insufficiently. One of the broader goals of the current study was to examine whether 
young children, in addition to understanding the epistemic consequences of 
perceptual access, perceive some extent of social value in affiliating with those who 
choose to verify the information they plan to communicate to others.  
2.2 Evaluating the Empirical Process 
Around the start of pre-school, children begin to show a more nuanced 
understanding that empirical claims should be based on sufficient evidence from a 
relevant source. There are particular conditions (i.e., situational circumstances) and 
processes (i.e., empirical practices) which lead to unearthing accurate information. 





access to an epistemic source, but whether an informant, further and decidedly, then 
employs the appropriate methods for obtaining sufficient evidential information.  
It is entirely plausible that one may have access to a relevant source and yet 
fail to appropriately utilize it. By four-years of age, children recognize this caveat; an 
informant’s access to an appropriate epistemic source is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for their stated empirical claim to be true (e.g., Nurmsoo & Robinson, 
2009). For instance, when presented with two informants, one observed to stand on 
top of a box while the other looks inside the box, Brosseau-Liard and Birch (2011) 
found that four- and five-year old children endorsed claims made by an informant 
who previously verified the box’s contents by looking inside: the correct evidentiary 
behavior for supporting a claim about its contents. Despite both informants having 
access to the relevant information source, children recognized that it is only a 
particular process that could lead to an accurate claim. Importantly, the claims made 
by informants who engaged in this particular process were endorsed regardless of 
their history of providing accurate or inaccurate labeling information (Brosseau-Liard 
& Birch, 2011).  
A previously accurate informant is thus not trusted indiscriminately; 
children’s reasoning about an informant’s reliability is informed by both their 
situational circumstances, of which may or may not afford opportunity to gather 
sufficient evidence, as well as the quality of their chosen empirical method. The 
process by which a claim is founded in can be evaluated in terms of whether it is 
likely to yield supporting evidence that is both accurate and adequate in substantiating 





briefly mentioned earlier, we found that three- to seven-year old children understand 
that verified claims are more acceptable than those made by informants who fail to 
verify or who do so insufficiently (Butler et al., in revision). However, the level of 
sophistication in children’s explanations as to why verified claims are more 
acceptable developed as a function of age. 
Children therefore demonstrate, as early as three-years of age, an 
understanding that it is only particular practices that support justification of a given 
empirical claim. However, the described findings do not indicate that young children 
necessarily see value in a standard of empirical practices. Our lab’s subsequent study 
addressed this question, examining whether children perceive a relationship between 
one’s empirical practices and their general trustworthiness as a competent teacher 
from whom a naïve puppet should learn. Children ages three to seven, reasoned that a 
puppet who verifies evidence is a better source of information and the preferred 
teacher, compared to a puppet who fails to verify (Butler et al. 2018). The tendency to 
advise the naïve puppet to look to a teacher who verifies suggests that the choice to 
verify the information one plans to communicate to others is perceived by young 
children as a valuable and important feature of a trustworthy source.  
The discussed findings show that children’s understanding of empirical 
practices that likely result in accurate testimony (i.e., verifying information from a 
relevant source) is effectively applied to future judgments about reliability. This 
reviewed research also suggests that children develop value-laden judgements as to 
the acceptability of stated empirical claims (Butler, et al., in revision) and one’s 





informant. An open question remains as to whether one’s choice to verify the 
empirical claims they make is perceived by young children as a positive quality of an 
individual for which they would like to affiliate.  
2.3 The Gap in the Developmental Literature  
Group membership is shown as particularly salient for early selective social 
learning. By two-years of age, children begin to privilege information from 
individuals belonging to particular social groups (e.g., Buttelmann et al., 2013). By 
the time children reach preschool age, they are more likely to seek or endorse 
information provided by those who belong to the same social group as themselves, as 
indicated by their race (Chen et al., 2013), age (Jaswal & Neely, 2006), gender 
(Shutts, Banaji, Spelke, 2010; Taylor, 2013), accent (Corriveau et al. 2013), or 
minimal group status (Elashi & Mills, 2014; MacDonald et al., 2013). In particular, 
shared minimal group membership seems to be weighed differentially than that of 
familiar social groups. For instance, by the age of four, children’s attendance to an 
informant’s history of accuracy overrides the influence of the informant’s shared 
group membership with themselves, as indexed by their age (Jaswal & Neely, 2006), 
gender (Taylor, 2013), and accent (Corriveau et al., 2013). Whereas, in the case of 
minimal group membership, children proceed to show no preference for either 
informant (Elashi & Mills, 2014; MacDonald et al., 2013).  
Relatedly, physical (e.g., hair color) and psychological (e.g., food preference) 
similarity is shown to be correlated to both adults’ and children’s perception of 





tendency to favorably characterize the in-group in comparison to the out-group; 
Billing & Tajfel, 1973). In Reyes-Jaquez’ and Echols’s (2013) study, for example, in 
the absence of other information, three-, four-, and five-year old children preferred 
similar over dissimilar informants as an epistemic source for object labels. When 
similarity intersected with an informant’s prior accuracy, five-year old’s, but not 
three- and four-year old’s, became less likely to avoid endorsing a previously 
inaccurate informant’s object labels if they were similar rather than dissimilar.  
The research reviewed in this section thus far highlights shared minimal group 
membership and perceived similarity as particularly salient dimensions by which 
children select informants. However, this work exclusively focuses on children’s use 
of group membership when making attributions of a particular type of semantic 
knowledge – object labeling. After thorough review of the available literature, only 
one study to date seems to have examined how young children weigh an informant’s 
group membership and level of access to empirical evidence in deciding whom to 
trust. This study found that, irrespective of their gender identification, three- and four-
year-old children tend to prefer an informant with access to a relevant evidentiary 
source (Terrier et al., 2016).  
In summary, in “factual” contexts (i.e. observable reality or “objectively 
accessible information,” Fedra & Schmidt, under review), children understand there 
are certain cues to what an informant is likely to know that are specific to the 
situation at hand. Further, children apply this understanding, at least in the case of 
gender, regardless of the informant’s group membership (Terrier et al., 2016). Young 





similar to themselves only manifests absent any information, other than the identity of 
the informant and their assertions of novel object labels. In certain contexts, 
children’s challenge in evaluating the validity of an empirical claim can be viewed as 
analogous to the challenges in determining the accuracy of novel object labels. When 
an empirical claim is presented without additional information about the source or 
process by which it is substantiated, like an object label, both claims are difficult, if 
not impossible, to verify by the young child.  
Privileging information from in-group members is posited to serve as a 
facilitator of the transmission of culturally relevant information (Harris, Koenig, 
Corriveau, & Jaswal, 2018). Trusting an in-group member’s novel object label may 
then serve this function, as this suggests a child’s attribution of semantic knowledge 
(i.e., prescriptive and culturally-shared information). Not represented in current 
literature however, is whether, in the absence of other information, children treat an 
in-group member’s empirical claim similarly. That is, an open question remains as to 
whether children are more likely to attribute episodic knowledge to an in-group 
member if presented with two informants’ contradicting empirical claims.  
Object-label assertions can only be evaluated based on a standard created 
through social consensus among agents in defining its meaning and appropriateness 
in its use and therefore solely transmittable through testimony (McMyler, 2007). The 
very nature of semantic knowledge is shaped, and its relevance defined, by members 
of a culture or community (see Diesendruck & Markson, 2011); and thus, inherently 





rather, the question of interest here is whether the choice to verify information prior 
to making an empirical claim does. 
2.4 The Present Studies Rationale and Overview  
The primary goal of the current studies is to examine whether children use 
their expectations related to verification behaviors to inform their attributions of 
verified and unverified claims to in- and out-group members. Minimal group 
membership and perceived similarity are shown to be particularly influential in 
guiding children’s trust in an informant’s semantic knowledge. The current 
investigation therefore aims to explore whether children utilize their epistemological 
understanding of verification behaviors to make inferences about whom they believe 
is likely to choose to verify the information they intend to share with others based on 
group membership and perceived similarity to others.  
These studies focus on 4 to 7-year old children. This age range is of 
theoretical significance for a number of reasons based in prior research, although 
none have examined the specific aims of the current study. First, 4-years of age is the 
youngest at which in-group biases such as explicit preferences for interaction with 
and perceived similarity to in-group members has been documented (Richter et al., 
2016), with stronger effects shown by 5- to 6-year-old children (Dunham, Baron, & 
Carey, 2011). Also by age 4, children’s social preferences are influenced by 
perceptions of similarity to others, such as sharing particular physical attributes or an 
attraction to particular foods or toys (e.g., Fawcett & Markson, 2010). Moreover, 





preferences for particular activities (Shutts, Roben, & Spelke, 2013) and objects 
(Richter et al., 2016; Shutts et al., 2013).  
By the time children reach preschool age, they are more likely to seek or 
endorse information provided by those who belong to the same social group as 
themselves, as indicated by their race (Chen et al., 2013), age (Jaswal & Neely, 
2006), gender (Shutts, Banaji, Spelke, 2010; Taylor, 2013), accent (Corriveau et al. 
2013), or minimal group status (Elashi & Mills, 2014; MacDonald et al., 2013). 
Children also tend to favor similar over dissimilar informants (Reyes-Jaquez & 
Echols, 2013).  
Second, the critical developments in children’s social cognitive capacities 
during this period (i.e. four- to seven- years of age) go beyond basic theory of mind – 
an understanding of mental states and the processes of knowledge acquisition (Kuhn, 
Cheney & Weinstock, 2000; Miller, Hardin, & Montgomery, 2003; Wellman, Cross 
& Watson, 2001). As early as three-years of age, children begin to incorporate a 
normative stance when learning from others (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013). A 
normative stance refers to the inductive lens through which observed regularities are 
understood as generic prescriptions and proscriptions of how others ought to behave. 
Children show a developing ability to both form and enforce normative expectations 
of others (Rokoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008). Prior research also suggests that 
young children are even prone to overinterpreting an observation of a singular 
arbitrary action – ascribing such an action as an objective normative rule that applies 





Schmidt et. al’s (2016) study, for instance, found that, even in the absence of 
explicit normative cues, three-year old children were quick to ascribe normativity to 
an agent’s actions so long as they were performed intentionally. There is also some 
evidence suggesting that children hold those with whom they affiliate to a higher 
standard–selectively protesting conventional norm transgressions made by in-group 
members over those of out-group members (Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2012). 
Again, however, these studies examine children’s ascription and enforcement of 
normative rules to conventional-type behaviors – such as when playing a board game 
and moving a token to a specific place in a particular way (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 
2013) or using familiar and novel artifacts in atypical ways (Casler, Terziyan, & 
Greene, 2009).  
Along the same lines, a great deal of prior work on selective trust concentrates 
on children’s evaluations of an informant’s knowledge or ignorance of the 
conventional use of language (i.e., labeling of familiar objects). Normative 
expectations for individuals to act in accordance with conventions, like the use of 
culturally and linguistically prescribed object labels, are to some degree arbitrarily 
ascribed. Conventional knowledge is not naturally available or verifiable as self-
evident or objectively true like knowledge claims related to an observable reality. 
Children’s trust in an informant is posited to be particularly sensitive to testimonial 
errors in the semantic domain because of conventional information’s defining feature; 
namely, that it is culturally shared, facilitating clear communication among members 





as objects labels are presupposed to be known by all those who share group 
membership and thus, semantic claims are themselves normative.  
Although empirical (i.e., verifiable) claims are not themselves normative, it is 
plausible that children begin to incorporate a normative stance towards forming 
expectations of one’s epistemic certainty when making an empirical claim. The 
epistemic certainty norm for assertions refers to the idea that when a speaker asserts 
something (e.g., empirical claim), they take on the commitment of transmitting this 
knowledge to the listener and thus, ought to adhere to greater requirements than that 
of a full belief (Stanley, 2008). In order to be epistemically “certain” of an empirical 
claim, the speaker must know, or be in the position to know, this information on the 
basis of sufficient evidence, providing them with the highest degree of justification 
for their statement.  
Butler et al.’s (in revision) study did not directly examine young children’s 
reasoning about verified claims from a normative perspective. However, the study’s 
findings reveal that between three- to four-years of age children begin to understand 
that verified claims are more acceptable than unverified claims. Children’s tendency 
to rate claims that are fully verified as more “okay” than those that are insufficiently 
or not at all verified, could suggest that children judged the speaker’s assertion as 
normatively acceptable based on the inferred epistemic certainty of the informant. In 
other words, children could have interpreted the experimenter’s questions as to how 
“okay” or “not okay” a given claim was in a normative light. If so, their ratings of 
fully verified claims as more “okay” can suggest an expectation that people ought to 





identify an agent who verifies evidence as a better source of information and the 
preferred teacher when compared to one who fails to verify can also be interpreted as 
indirect evidence in support of this notion (Butler et al., 2018).  
Thus, there are two theoretical perspectives guiding the hypotheses for the 
current studies. One possibility is that young children perceive some extent of social 
value in the choice to verify the information one plans to communicate to others. 
Another possibility, while not negating the first, is that young children incorporate 
normative expectations as to the conditions under which it is acceptable to make an 
empirical claim. Regarding the first perspective and as previously discussed, prior 
research has established that children are inclined towards drawing social 
comparisons that positively differentiate their minimal in-group members from 
minimal out-group members (Baron & Dunham, 2015; Dunham et al., 2011; Dunham 
& Emory, 2014; Spielman, 2000). Therefore, it was predicted that if the choice to 
verify information prior to making an empirical claim holds some extent of social 
value then children may be more likely to attribute verified claims to in-group 
members or those perceived as similar to themselves.  
In relation to the second perspective, it is important to note that the current 
study does not directly test whether children hold an expectation of a speaker’s 
adherence to a norm of epistemic certainty. Nevertheless, it was hypothesized that if 
children do hold such an expectation, then a speaker who proceeds to make an 
empirical claim without verifying its informational content would be seen as less 





attributions of unverified claims to out-group members or those perceived as 
dissimilar to themselves.  
Along the same lines, children may also hold those with whom they affiliate 
to a higher standard (e.g., Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2012), expecting in-group 
members’ knowledge of and adherence to the epistemic certainty norm at greater 
levels than members of their out-group; thus, children may be more likely to make 
attributions of verified claims to members of their in-group. However, it is also 
plausible that children generalize their expectation of epistemic certainty to all 
individuals who make an empirical claim, irrespective of group affiliation. In this 
case, children would be just as likely to make attributions of verified claims to in-
group members than they would to out-group members.  
The current studies will lay groundwork for an important line of future 
research. Namely, this investigation will shed light as to whether children utilize their 
epistemological understanding of verification behaviors to make inferences about 
whom they believe is likely to choose to verify the information they intend to share 
with others based on their own social affiliations (i.e. shared group membership and 





Chapter 3: Pilot Experiment 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants  
A sample of 36 four- to seven-year-old children participated in this 
experiment of which there were 9 four-year-olds (M=4;7, range=4;1- 4;11 ; 6 female 
and 3 male), 12 five-year-olds (M=5;5, range=5;0-5;11 ; 6 female and 6 male), 8 six-
year-olds (M=6;4, range=6;0-6;11 ; 6 female and 2 male), and 7 seven-year-olds 
(M=7;5, range=7;0-7;11 ; 3 female and 4 male). Participants were recruited from the 
children’s museum and only those whose parents had given their consent were 
included in the study. Participants’ ethnicity information was reported by a parent 
upon completing the consent form, of which 20 (56%) identified as Caucasian /White, 
6 (17%) as African-American or Black, 2 (5.5%) identified as Hispanic or Latino, 1 
(3%) as Asian or Pacific Islander, 5 (14%) as Biracial/Mixed Race, and 1 (3%) was 
unreported. Each child was tested individually by a single experimenter for about 10-
15 minutes. An additional 2 participants (1 female and 1 male) were tested but 
excluded from the final sample, one due to an experimenter’s mistake and one due to 
an incomplete parental consent form.  
3.1.2 Setup and Materials 
Trained experimenters invited each child to participate in an experimental 
session and directed them to a quiet space designated by the research staff at the Port 





beginning the session. Parents were then asked to quietly wait in the general vicinity 
of the testing space and were told that they may observe the session.  
The area in which the experimental session took place contained one video 
camera with its stand, two chairs (one for the child and the other for the 
experimenter), and a table for the study materials. The experimenter sat perpendicular 
to the participant’s seat that directly faced a 13-inch laptop screen. The video camera 
was set up adjacent to the child’s seat to focus to the recording on which particular 
stimuli the child points to during the session. The orange and green group markers 
used for the minimal group manipulation included: an armband, sticker, and solid-
color bandana. Children drew one colored coin for their minimal group assignment 
from a small grey bucket that held 200 plastic circular counters-chips, half of which 
were green, and the other half were orange. Participant responses for each of the three 
measures were recorded by the experimenter on a form which included the 
experimenter’s script, specifically designated for each of the 12 orders. 
3.1.3 Design 
The stimuli presented to participant as representing in-group and out-group 
members were drawings of Caucasian/White children, whose appearance only 
differed in hair color and whether they wore orange or green group markers. In order 
to prevent any possible effects of gender or particular hair color preferences, all 
stimuli matched participants’ gender and further, in-group and out-group member 
dyads were always presented as identical in hair color. Thus, all stimuli pairs were 
only distinguishable by their respective group color markers. Child participants were 





participants allocated to each order, of which two participants (one female and one 
male) from each age group were assigned. Among the 12 orders, half of the digital 
slideshows presented a demonstration of a single child-stimuli drawing a green-
colored coin prior to another single child-stimuli drawing an orange-colored coin, 
while the remaining orders showed the reversed (see procedure details below). The 
otherwise identical, in-group and out-group member dyads, were presented in 
counterbalanced order across participants and trials.  
3.1.4 Procedure 
The experiment procedure closely followed Richter et al.’s (2016) procedure 
in the minimal group induction and both the explicit attitude and shared preference 
measures; while, the behavioral attribution measure was adapted for the goals of this 
study. 
3.1.4.1 Minimal-group Induction 
The experimenter introduced participants’ minimal group assignment by first 
telling a story with supporting visuals about two other children who each “blindly” 
drew a colored coin from a bucket to determine their group membership. Following 
the child-stimulus group assignment, the experimenter explained that each child-
stimuli would now wear three group markers, in their respective group color, 
including: (1) an armband, (2) a solid-color rectangular sticker, and (3) a solid-color 
scarf. In order to make group distinctions salient, participants then viewed other 
drawings of individual children belonging to the green and orange groups. Upon 
viewing a single orange or green minimal-group member, the experimenter asked 





Participants must have correctly identified the presented stimuli’s group membership 
on at least four out of the five trials for their data to be used in the analyses. All 36 
participants correctly identified group membership of the presented stimuli on each of 
the five trials.  
Next, participants drew a green or orange colored-coin from a grey bucket 
similar to the one pictured in the stimulus demonstration. Once the participant 
identified which color coin they drew, they were provided with the three group 
markers in their respective group color to be worn. To confirm children’s recognition 
of their own membership in the green or orange minimal-group, the participant then 
viewed both two groups of children. A group of children belonging to the green 
minimal-group and well as a group of children belonging to the orange minimal-
group were presented adjacent to one another on the laptop screen and children were 
asked to point to and identify the color of which group they belong. The child then 
proceeded to the group affiliation measures described in the next section. Following 
completion of all three measures, the experimenter thanked the child for their 
participation and announced the end of the game.  
3.2 Measures 
3.2.1 Explicit Attitude 
Participants were shown a series of pictures of other children on the lap-top 
screen and instructed to point to which child they like better or would like to play 
with if they had the chance. There were five trials, each of which presented two group 





out-group. The experimenter recorded whether the child preferred an in-group 
member (coded as “1”) or whether they preferred an out-group member (coded as 
“0”) for each of the five trials. The total number of trials each child chose an in-group 
member was also recorded (range = 0 – 5).  
3.2.2 Shared Preference 
Participants were presented with object pairs belonging to the same category 
and instructed to point to which object they like better (e.g., airplane and train; see 
Table 1 on the following page). Following their selection, the participant’s preferred 
choice appeared in the center of a stimuli pair, depicting one in-group and one out-
group member. The experimenter then asked, “Who do you think also likes [object 
preference] better?” Participants were instructed to point to one of the group members 
viewed on the screen in response to the posed question (see Figure 1 on the following 
page). The experimenter recorded whether children’s preferred choice was an in-
group member (coded as “1”) or an out-group member (coded as “0”). The total 






































Which do you like better, apples or bananas? 
2 
 
Which do you like better, dogs or cats? 
3 
 
Which do you like better, airplanes or trains? 
4 
 
Which do you like better, milk or juice? 
5 
 
Which do you like better, vanilla or chocolate 
ice cream? 





3.2.3 Behavioral attribution 
The experimenter informed participants that they will hear about “some things 
that happened” and that their job is to point to which group member they think “did 
that”. The experimenter presented a total of eight vignettes, in which each described 
an unidentified individual expresses curiosity relating to the contents or properties of 
a particular thing and concludes with this individual making a verifiable claim about 
their object of curiosity. However, the individuals’ empirical practices differ among 
the presented items. Following their expressed curiosity, four of the vignettes 
describe an individual who verifies information from a relevant source prior to 
making a claim (verified condition) while the other four vignettes describe an 
individual who proceeds to make a claim without verifying its informational content 
(unverified condition). Trained experimenters took great care to display a neutral 
disposition, both in their body language and verbal delivery of each task item. In 
doing so, the experimenter could avoid the potential influence of a participant’s 
perception of the actions or inactions described in each item as being viewed 
positively or negatively by the experimenter.  
In four of the eight trials, the experimenter described an individual who 
wonders about the contents of a particular container (i.e. box, classroom door, 
backpack, and bottle), and who then continues to look or not look inside the container 
prior to making a claim about its contents (see Table 2 for “container” behavioral 
attribution items). In the remaining four trials, rather than presenting situations in 
which “looking” inside something is required for verification, the experimenter 





appropriate evidence in support of their claim (see Table 3 for “non-container” 
behavioral attribution items). Upon viewing a pair of in- and out-group member 
stimuli, the experimenter instructed the participant to point to which target they 
believe made the verified or unverified claim (see Figure 2 below). The experimenter 
then recorded the child’s selection for each of the eight trials. Children’s selections in 
the verified condition were coded as “1” for in-group members and “0” for out-group 
members. For the unverified condition, children’s selections were coded as “1” for 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.3.1 Explicit Attitude 
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with trial as the within 
subject variable and with age (4, 5, 6, and 7 years of age) and gender as the between-
subjects variables revealed no main effect or interactions among these factor 
variables. The number of times children preferred an in-group member over an out-
group member were collapsed across trial, age group, and gender for subsequent 
analyses. Replicating results from Richter et al. (2016), children showed a significant 
preference for in-group members across trials, M = 3.25, t(35) = 2.728, p = .01, d = 
0.46 (two-tailed).  
3.3.2 Shared Preference  
Next, for the shared preference task responses, a repeated-measures ANOVA 
with trial as the within subject variable and with age and gender as the between-
subjects variables was conducted and revealed no main effect or interactions among 
these factor variables. The number of times children ascribed similar preferences to 
an in-group member versus an out-group member was collapsed across trial, age 
group, and gender for the following analyses. Further replicating results from Richter 
et al. (2016), children’s selections revealed perceived similarity to in-group members 







3.3.3 Behavioral Attributions 
For children’s responses on the behavioral attribution measure, the total 
number of trials children made attributions of verified claims to in-group members 
and attributions of unverified claims to out-group members will be referred to in the 
reporting of subsequent analyses as bias-consistent responses. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA with condition (verified versus unverified claims) and trial as the within 
subject variables and age (4, 5, 6, and 7 years of age) and gender as the between-
subjects variables was tested and revealed no main effect of trial or condition, nor any 
interactions among the entered variables. The number of bias-consistent responses 
were then collapsed across both verified and unverified conditions as well as across 
trial, age, and gender. Results revealed that children’s selections were consistent with 
predicted group biases significantly above chance, M = 4.83, t(35) = 2.74, p < .05, d = 
0.46 (two-tailed).  
To further clarify the results above revealing a tendency for selecting bias-
consistent responses across both verified and unverified conditions in the behavioral 
attributions task, the following responses were separated and used as independent 
variables for further analysis: 1) number of in-group member selections in the verified 
condition (range = 0 – 4); and 2) number of out-group member selections in the 
unverified condition (range = 0 – 4). Results revealed that children made attributions 
of verified claims to in-group members significantly above chance, M = 2.64, SD = 
1.15), t(35)=3.33, p < .01, d = 0.56 (two-tailed). Whereas, children made attributions 
of unverified claims to out-group members at levels of chance, M = 2.19, t(35) = 



























The box and 
whisker plots show children’s responses across the three administered group 
affiliation measures; however, the behavioral attributions shown are separated by 
condition (i.e. in-group member selections in the verified condition and out-group 
member selections in the unverified condition). The boxes indicate the first and fourth 
quartiles and the solid lines inside the boxes represent the medians. The dashed lines 
capture the location of extreme values. The horizontal, red dashed line indicates the 
chance level (50%).  
 
3.3.4 Relationship Among Variables 
3.3.4.1 Explicit Attitudes and Behavioral Attributions 
A Pearson’s correlation coefficient was calculated to examine individual 
differences in explicit attitudes towards in-group members and participants’ bias-
consistent responses on the behavior attribution task. The relationship among 
children’s explicit social preference for in-group members and their bias-consistent 
selections was marginally statistically significant, r = .33, p = .05. Next, the relation 





in-group member selections in the verified condition as well as out-group member 
selections in the unverified condition was further examined. The correlation among 
attributions of verified claims to in-group members and explicit social preferences for 
in-group members approached significance, r = .27, p = .056. Yet, there was no 
significant relation among children’s attribution of unverified claims to out-group 
members and their social preferences for in-group members, r = .22, p = .098.  
3.3.4.2 Ascriptions of Shared Preferences and Behavioral Attributions 
Individual differences in children’s ascriptions of similar preferences as their 
own to in-group members was then examined in relation to participants’ bias-
consistent responses on the behavior attribution task. The relationship among 
children’s perceived similarity to in-group members and their bias-consistent 
selections was not statistically significant, r = .237, p = .165. Further, there was no 
significant relation among children’s ascriptions of interpersonal similarity to in-
group members and their attributions of verified claims to in-group members, r = 
.159, p = .355. The relationship between children’s ascriptions of interpersonal 
similarity to in-group members and their attributions of unverified claims to out-
group members was also not statistically significant, r =.188, p = .272.  
3.4 Discussion 
This investigation tested a small sample of children and therefore, 
interpretations of these results are not intended to be presented as precise and 
generalizable representations of the population. However, the results of this Pilot 





some extent of social value in affiliating with those who choose to verify the 
information they assert to others. Children’s affiliation with a particular group seemed 
to have guided whom they made attributions of verified, but not unverified, claims. 
Specifically, children were inclined to make attributions of verified claims to in-group 
members; however, they were just as likely to make attributions of unverified claims 
to in-group members than they were to out-group members.  
Replicating Richter et al.’s (2016) findings, children showed a significant 
preference for and tendency to ascribe interpersonal similarity to in-group members. 
Yet, only children’s social preferences for in-group members, not children’s 
perceived similarity to them, seemed to guide predictions of group members’ 
standards of empirical practice. Children’s explicit social preference for (i.e. greater 
“liking” of) in-group members was found to be significantly related, albeit marginally 
so, to their attributions of verified and unverified claims that are consistent with the 
predicted group biases. This relationship was mostly maintained by children’s 
significant inclination to make attributions of verified claims to in-group members, as 
they did not demonstrate a tendency to make attributions of unverified claims to out-
group members.  
This particular finding can be interpreted as preliminary support for the 
prediction that children hold an expectation of a certain standard of empirical 
practices for those whom they affiliate (e.g., Schmidt et al., 2012), and further, that 
one’s choice to verify is perceived as a positive quality of an individual for which 
they would like to affiliate. Not predicted, however, was children’s seeming lack of 





their professed empirical claim. Although lacking such an expectation is consistent 
with prior research suggesting young children’s difficulty in attributing mental states 
to out-group members (Mcloughlin & Over, 2017).  
As discussed earlier, the small sample size in this Pilot Experiment is a 
critically restrictive factor in being able to reliably interpret these results. The number 
of participants was limited to what is reported here because of the possibility that the 
presented stimuli differentially influenced children’s perception of social affiliation. 
All children, regardless of race or ethnic background, were presented with drawings 
of Caucasian/White children as representation of their in-group and out-group 
members. Despite the fact that participants wore the same group markers (i.e., green 
or orange colored armband, scarf, and sticker) as the presented stimuli, the degree to 
which children identified with their minimal group members may have been 
influenced by an attendance to their apparent racial background.  
In the Main Experiment, therefore, the stimulus was altered so as to appear 
racially ambiguous. This modification was made so that participants’ perception of 
social affiliation to the child drawings, intended to represent participants’ in- and out-
group members, could only be influenced by the minimal group categorizations 
themselves, rather than confounded by whether or not participants share the stimulus’ 
racial background. In the original stimulus, group member dyads were shown has 
having either black, dark brown, light brown, blonde, or red matching hair color. 
Pairs of group members were always presented with identical hair color, so that the 





group members. In order for the stimulus to appear as racially ambiguous, the skin 
tone was altered but still remained uniform among all group members.  
The original stimuli’s varying hair colors was primarily used to ensure that 
members of each group appeared as distinct individuals; however, to further ensure 
racial ambiguity, group member dyads’ hair colors were comprised of slight 
variations of brown and black. Because the new hair colors were not as distinct from 
one another as the original stimulus, some of the group member dyads were given 
glasses and freckles to strengthen their appearance as clearly distinct individuals. The 
key contrast among in-group and out-group member dyads remained their minimal 






Chapter 4: Main Experiment 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants 
 A sample of 96 four- to seven-year-old children participated in this 
experiment of which there were 24 four-year-olds (M=4;6, range=4;0-4;10; 12 female 
and 12 male), 24 five-year-olds (M=5;5, range=5;0-5;11 ; 12 female and 12 male), 24 
six-year-olds (M=6;5, range=6;0-6;11, 12 female and 12 male), and 24 seven-year-
olds (M=7;5, range=7;1-7;11 ; 12 female and 12 male). Among the full sample, 87 
children were recruited both from the children’s museum while the remaining nine 
participants were recruited from a database of families who had previously expressed 
interest in research participation at the University of Maryland. Only children whose 
parents had given their consent were included in the study. Participants’ ethnicity 
information was reported by a parent upon completing the consent form, of which 63 
(i.e., 66%) identified as Caucasian /White, 11 (i.e., 11.5%) as African-American or 
Black, 3 (i.e., 3%) as Hispanic or Latino, 9 (9.4%) as Asian or Pacific Islander, 9 
(9.4%) as Biracial/Mixed Race, and 1 (1%) was unreported. Each child was tested 
individually by a single experimenter for about 10-15 minutes.  
 An additional 14 children (7 females and 7 males) were tested but excluded 
from the final sample. Among the excluded children, six were excluded due to 
explicit statements identifying either green or orange as their favorite color, one due 
to ending the session early and parent informing the experimenter of the child’s 





were excluded due to the experimenter presenting the wrong order of the slideshow 
and thus, were considered “extra” and dropped from subsequent analyses using the 
pre-determined sample size of 96 participants.  
4.1.2 Setup and Materials 
 The setup of the physical space in which the experimental session took place 
as well as the materials were identical to that of the Pilot Experiment.  
4.1.3 Design 
The experimental design for Main Experiment matched that of Pilot 
Experiment, with one exception. The in-group and out-group member stimuli were 
altered to appear racially ambiguous.  
4.1.4 Procedure 
 The Main Experiment adopted the procedure followed by the Pilot 
Experiment, using the altered stimuli described above for the minimal-group 
induction and all tasks that followed. 
4.1.5 Measures 
4.1.5.1 Explicit Attitude  
The explicit attitude measure was identical to that of the Pilot Experiment. 
However, when participants were instructed to point to which child they liked better, 























4.1.5.2 Shared Preference 
The shared preference task was also identical to that of Pilot Experiment, 
using the same test stimuli shown in Table 1 with one exception. The fifth item 
shown in Table 1 was changed; participants were instead presented with a picture of a 
vanilla and strawberry ice cream cone and the experimenter’s question that followed 
identification of their preferred choice was appropriately revised (see Table 3). 
Children were also shown altered stimuli pairs when asked to ascribe their preferred 
choice to a group member (See Figure 4).  
 









Which do you like better, vanilla or 
strawberry ice cream? 























4.1.5.3 Behavioral Attributions 
The presented test stimuli and scenarios for the behavioral attributions task 
was identical to that of Pilot Experiment, except for children viewing the altered 
stimuli pairs when instructed to point to which group member they attribute the 


















Figure 5. Sample Stimuli Pair for Shared Preference Task 






4.1.6.1 Explicit Attitude 
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with trial as the within 
subject variable and with age (4, 5, 6, and 7 years of age) and gender as the between-
subjects variables revealed no main effect or interactions among these factor 
variables. The number of times children preferred an in-group member over an out-
group member were collapsed across trial, age group, and gender for subsequent 
analyses. Results reveal that children showed a significant preference for in-group 
members across trials, M = 3.25, t(95) = 4.723, p < 0.001, d = 0.48 (two-tailed).  
4.1.6.2 Shared Preference 
Next, for the shared preference task responses, a repeated-measures ANOVA 
with trial as the within subject variable and with age and gender as the between-
subjects variables was conducted and revealed no main effect or interactions among 
these factor variables. The number of times children ascribed similar preferences to 
an in-group member versus an out-group member was collapsed across trial, age 
group, and gender for the following analysis. Children’s selections revealed perceived 
similarity to in-group members across trials significantly above chance, M = 3.18, SD 
= 1.34), t(95) = 2.79, p < 0.001, d = 0.51 (two-tailed). 
4.1.6.3 Behavioral Attributions 
A repeated-measures ANOVA with condition (verified versus unverified 





and gender as the between-subjects variables revealed no main effect of trial or 
condition, nor any interactions among the entered variables. The number of bias-
consistent responses were therefore collapsed across both verified and unverified 
conditions as well as across trial, age, and gender for the following analysis. Unlike 
the Pilot Experiment, children assigned verified and unverified claims consistent with 
predicted group biases on 50% of the trials, that is, chance performance, M = 4.02, 
t(95) = 0.12, p = 0.91, d = 0.01 (two-tailed).  
To further clarify children’s responses across both verified and unverified 
conditions in the behavioral attributions task, attributions of verified claims to in-
group members and attributions of unverified claims to out-group members were 
separated and used as independent variables for the following analyses. Results 
revealed that children made attributions of verified claims to in-group members 53% 
of the time, which does not significantly differ from chance performance, M = 2.09, 
t(95) = 0.77, p = 0.45, d = 0.08 (two-tailed). Similarly, children made attributions of 
unverified claims to out-group members 48% of the time, which also does not 






























The box and 
whisker plots show children’s responses across the three administered group 
affiliation measures; however, the behavioral attributions shown are separated by 
condition (i.e. in-group member selections in the verified condition and out-group 
member selections in the unverified condition). The boxes indicate the first and fourth 
quartiles and the solid lines inside the boxes represent the medians. The dashed lines 
capture the location of extreme values. The horizontal, red dashed line indicates the 
chance level (50%).  
 
4.1.6.4 Relationship Among Variables  
4.1.6.4.1 Explicit Attitudes and Behavioral Attributions  
A Pearson’s correlation coefficient was calculated to examine individual 
differences in participants’ favoring of in-group members and their bias-consistent 
responses on the behavior attribution task. The relationship among children’s social 
preference for in-group members and their bias-consistent selections was not 
significant, r = .34, p = .74. Next, the relation among children’s social preference for 
in-group members and attributions of verified and unverified claims were examined 





group members and their social preferences for in-group members was not 
significant, r = .13, p = .19. Likewise, the correlation between children’s attribution 
of unverified claims to out-group members and their social preferences for in-group 
members did not indicate a significant relationship, r = -.08, p = .42.  
4.1.6.4.2 Ascriptions of Shared Preferences and Behavioral Attributions  
Individual differences in children’s ascriptions of similar preferences as their 
own to in-group members was then examined in relation to participants’ bias-
consistent responses on the behavior attribution task. The relationship among 
children’s perceived similarity to in-group members and their bias-consistent 
selections was not statistically significant, r = .17, p = .09. However, there was a 
significant relation among children’s ascriptions of interpersonal similarity to in-
group members and their attributions of verified claims to in-group members, r = .30, 
p < 0.01. The relationship between children’s in-group member selections on the 
shared preference task and their attributions of unverified claims to out-group 
members was also investigated, however, the correlation among these variables 
proved insignificant, r = -.05, p = .64.  
4.1.7 Discussion 
The results from this Main Experiment diverge from the initial trends shown 
in the Pilot Experiment. Children’s attributions of both verified and unverified claims 
that were consistent with predicted group-biases, did not differ from chance. This 
pattern held when both types of attributions are analyzed separately by condition. 





as they were an out-group member. Likewise, children were just as likely to make 
attributions of unverified claims to an out-group member as they were to an in-group 
member.  
Further replicating prior work, children demonstrated a significant preference 
for in-group members on the explicit attitude task (e.g., Richter et al., 2016); 
however, their social preferences did not predict their attributions of verified claims 
to in-group members, nor their attributions of unverified claims to out-group 
members in the behavioral attributions task. Also in line with previous work cited 
above, children tended to ascribe similar preferences as their own to in-group 
members. This trend did in fact relate to children’s tendency to make attributions of 
verified claims to in-group members, but not to their attributions of unverified claims 
to out-group members.  
 Overall, we did not find evidence of children’s epistemological understanding 
of verification behaviors as informing their inferences about group membership. 
Specifically, children did not seem to differentially attribute verification behaviors to 
members of their in-group than to those of their out-group. Although, those who held 
perceptions of in-group members as similar to themselves also tended to attribute 
verified claims to in-group members. It is the possibility that this particular finding 
supports the hypothesis that children perceive one’s choice to verify as a positive 
quality of an individual for which they would like to affiliate. As children understand 
that verifying evidence from a relevant source is required to yield relevant episodic 
knowledge (e.g., Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009; Butler et al., 2018), they may have 





described individual in the verified condition. Yet, this explanation is only 
speculation; it is difficult to interpret the significance of this relationship, given that 
despite children’s significant inclination to ascribe similarity to in-group members, 






Chapter 5:  General Discussion 
Achieving scientific literacy is to understand the scientific ways of knowing 
(Maienschein, 1999). To promote young children’s development of such an 
understanding requires an emphasis on the process of acquiring knowledge, 
producing skeptical habits of mind and a willingness to revise beliefs when faced 
with new evidence (Maienschein, 1999; Nelson, 1999). The development and 
importance of these habits is typically described in reference to taking a critical 
stance towards the information presented by others. We rely a great deal on what 
others tell us to acquire knowledge that may otherwise be difficult to obtain on our 
own (Harris, 2012). Testimony thus serves as an efficient means for the transmission 
of knowledge between individuals (e.g., Dawkins, 1993). However, in order to truly 
serve this purpose, it can be argued that a normative standard for making assertions 
with epistemic certainty is required (Stanley, 2008). In situations that do not provide 
an opportunity to assess an informant’s process, without such a standard, individuals 
are prone to trusting misleading or false information. 
Technological advancements currently facilitate almost instantaneous global 
circulation and retrieval of testimony. Children and adults alike are increasingly faced 
with a task of evaluating empirical claims without an ability to assess the validity of 
an informant’s process. In such cases, individuals may rely on intuitive heuristics 
based on the identity of the informant. Despite the fact that, in most cases, group 
membership is irrelevant to the reliability of one’s empirical claim, it is often the 
most immediately available pieces of information upon initial introduction to an 





affiliate (i.e., in-group members; Billing & Tajfel, 1973) may thus guide individuals’ 
epistemic trust in others.  Specifically, individuals’ ascriptions of trust may be based 
on biased attributions of informants’ standards of empirical practices. 
Without practicing skeptical habits of mind in relation to the role social 
motivations play, we risk choosing faulty sources or unknowingly filtering the 
information we receive. There is some evidence of this in adult research, as in 
Metzger, Flanagin, and Medder’s (2010) study where adults explain the importance 
of perceived similarity to a source, in terms of shared values, when evaluating the 
reliability of online information; the participants highlighted this to be especially true 
when searching for information about current events (e.g., see also Meirick & 
Bessarabova, 2016). The investigation at hand sought to explore whether young 
children use their expectations related to verification behaviors to inform their 
attributions of verified and unverified claims to in- and out-group members. 
Participants were asked to make attributions of verified and unverified claims related 
to an observable reality to minimal group members. A greater inclination to ascribe 
verified claims to members of one’s in-group was theorized to suggest participants’ 
positive characterization of an individual based on their choice to verify the claims 
they make to others. Along the same lines, a greater inclination to ascribe unverified 
claims to out-group members was theorized to suggest a negative characterization of 
an individual based on their choice not to verify.  
We found that children were just as likely to predict that an in-group member 
made a verified claim as they were an out-group member. Likewise, results show that 





claim as they were an in-group member. Children’s perceived similarity to in-group 
members was, however, found to relate to their attributions of verified claims to in-
group members. Although our predictions were not entirely supported, there are a 
number of plausible explanations for these outcomes. Below is a review of three 
issues in relation to the present behavioral attributions task proposed as falling short 
of addressing the empirical questions at hand.  
5.1 The Interpersonal Dimension of Testimony 
The items presented in the behavioral attributions task each described a single 
individual as expressing curiosity about the contents or a particular feature of an 
encountered object. Regardless of whether or not they proceed to verify this 
information, each scenario concluded with the individual “saying” a plausible 
response to their previously expressed curiosity. Critically, as it is only a single 
individual that is referenced in each scenario, such statements are not in fact 
testimonial claims. Testimony is defined as an intentional act in which a credible 
assertion is communicated to another person (Harris & Koenig, 2006). Although 
individuals were clearly described to have verified or not verified the information 
they wondered about, it is possible that children did not view either act in a positive 
or negative light due the fact that someone else was not seemingly intended to be the 
listener of that information. Surely it is conceivable for an individual to not be 
expected to verify all that they wonder to themselves about.  
A more appropriate method to test our predictions may be presenting 





type of scenario would provide more context for participants to evaluate the potential 
social value of verifying the information that one intends to communicate to others. It 
would be important, however, to ensure that the listener of this assertion would not be 
perceived by participants to have witnessed whether or not the individual verified 
their claim. As previously discussed, prior work has established that by four-years of 
age, children appropriately attribute relevant episodic knowledge to informants 
observed to have perceptual access to a relevant information source (e.g., Brosseau-
Liard & Birch, 2011; Ganea, Koenig, & Millet, 2011; Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009; 
Pillow, 1989; Robinson, Champion, & Mitchell, 1999). If presented with the 
interpersonal situation that is described above, children would therefore understand 
that it is only the verifying individual that could know, or be epistemically certain, of 
the information they communicate. What is still unknown, based on the current 
studies, is whether children would be socially inclined towards those who verify, as 
well as socially disinclined towards those who fail to verify the claims they make to 
others.  
5.2 Verification (Or Not) As an Intentional Act  
A central question of the current investigation is whether children perceive 
one’s choice to verify the information they communicate to others as a positive 
quality of an individual with whom they would like to affiliate. In order to address 
this empirical question, scenarios must then clearly illustrate that such a conscious 
decision was made. Another methodological concern of the behavioral attribution 





verifying or failing to verify information. Despite clearly stating whether or not the 
individual performed the correct evidentiary action (e.g., wondering how many 
gummy bears there are in a jar and then counting or not counting them), the situations 
were presented without any indication that an active-choice was made to verify or 
not. One option to address this point is to add to the current scenarios an explicit 
reference to the individual’s conscious choice. For instance, following the individual 
stating their curiosity as to what is inside a box, rather than presenting in its current 
version, “then, they looked [did not look] in the box and said there are crayons in the 
box!”, the following could be used in its place, “they stopped to think and decided 
that they would [not] look inside the box. Then, they said there are crayons in the 
box!”. This addition to the scenario scripts would leave little room for participants to 
interpret any other factors other than the individual’s conscious choice as the cause 
for whether or not a verified or unverified claim was made.  
5.3 Presentation Modality and Its Effects on Comprehension 
Another consideration is the cognitive load imposed by presenting the eight 
scenarios verbally. Prior research has established that young children demonstrate 
better story-recall and comprehension when presented in an audiovisual format, 
compared to only audio (Beagles-Roos & Gat, 1983; Gibbons, Anderson, Smith, 
Field, & Fischer, 1986). Therefore, although the additions to the current scenarios 
described above may better address our central question, a certain level of the young 
participants’ listening comprehension is required. The advantages of utilizing an 





optimizing young children’s comprehension of the situations in which verifiable 
claims are made. For instance, instead of explicitly stating that the individual made 
the “decision” to verify or not to verify the information wondered about, audio-
visually presented scenarios would allow for the individual’s choice to be inferred. 
The participants would have an opportunity to deduce from individuals’ particular 
behaviors that they were aware of how to verify the information wondered about and 
that they chose to follow through or not to follow through on obtaining evidence prior 
to making a claim.  
This point seems especially important in two respects. First, young children 
are shown to be more forgiving of testimonial errors if an informant does not have 
appropriate access to an information source (e.g., Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009). 
Second, and in extension, if children do hold a normative expectation that one ought 
to make claims with epistemic certainty, then it is likely prescribed in a particular 
context. That is, children may expect adherence to such a norm with the stipulation 
that the individual is perceived both to have access to the relevant epistemic source 
and to understand the particular process that is required to obtain evidence in support 
of their claim. Thus, in possible future work, it is crucial for participants to recognize 
that the individual exercises agency when deciding whether or not to verify the 
information they plan to communicate to others is in fact accurate.  
In order to meet the goals outlined above, I discuss how one of the present 
task items-- describing an individual who wonders whether a red or yellow ball rolls 
faster down a ramp-- could be adapted. In a video of such a scenario, following the 





could proceed to put both balls on the ramp so as to demonstrate their understanding 
of how to verify the information they seek. In the verified condition, to illustrate the 
individual’s active-choice to verify, they could be shown as pausing to think while 
looking at both balls they just placed at the top of the ramp. They could then nod their 
head and continue to drop both balls down the ramp before claiming that the yellow 
ball rolls faster than the red one. Whereas in the unverified condition, in order to 
depict the individual’s active-choice not to verify, following their pause to think, they 
could proceed to take both balls off the ramp and place them on the ground before 
also making the assertion that the yellow ball is the faster of the two.  
The discussion thus far has focused on three issues related the behavioral 
attributions task in providing an adequate empirical test of these studies’ central 
questions. In brief review, the scenarios presented to participants failed to depict 
interpersonal contexts in which individuals made an active-choice to verify or not to 
verify the claim they make to others. Further, the modality by which the scenarios 
were presented to participants potentially hindered comprehension of the situations 
for which their attributions were based. Taken together, participants may not have had 
a clear understanding of both the intended contexts, and even those that were in fact 
presented, when asked to make attributions of verified and unverified statements to 
minimal in- and out-group members.  
In subsequent discussion, children’s general tendency to trust claims that are 
consistent with existing intuitions is also considered. I explain how this tendency 
could indicate that the plausible statements made by individuals in the behavioral 





necessarily required to be verified. I then turn to a discussion of the second posed 
consideration, raising questions about young children’s perception of a relationship 
between evidentiary behaviors and an informant’s honesty.  
5.4 Plausible Versus Verified Claims  
Some have argued that young children and adults alike demonstrate a general 
tendency to trust testimony (Gilbert, 1991; Jaswal, Croft, Setia, & Cole, 2010; 
Sperber, 2001). Prior work indeed suggests that if there is no clear reason to doubt an 
encountered claim, both children and adults default to a trust in its accuracy. In 
various domains, it is reasonable to do so, as there are myriad cases where it can be 
difficult or impossible for one to gather direct perceptual evidence for verifying what 
they have been told (Harris, 2012).  
Young children’s bias to trust new information seems to hold true even when 
it contradicts their intuitive conceptions of the world--such as when learning about 
scientific concepts like the existence of invisible germs and the spherical shape of the 
earth as well as religious concepts such as Heaven and God as an all-knowing and all-
powerful being ((Braswell, Rosengren, & Berenbaum, 2012; Guerroro, Enesco, & 
Harris, 2010; Lane & Harris, 2015). In contrast to these cases, there are some 
instances where children can easily test an informant’s claim. For example, if 
presented with a group of objects and told that when dropped from a certain height 
some will bounce, and some will break, children could easily test this claim and learn 





upon collision. Prior research suggests a developmental pattern in children’s tendency 
to seek evidence for verifying a presented claim.  
For example, in Ronfard, Chen, and Harris’s (2018) study, participants were 
presented with two forms of testimony (i.e. intuitive and counterintuitive) and 
provided an opportunity to verify their accuracy. Their findings reveal that four and 
seven-year-old children were not compelled to verify an experimenter’s claim when it 
was consistent with their existing intuitions (i.e. intuitive testimony; “the largest 
within a group of dolls is the heaviest”). It was only when presented with a 
counterintuitive claim (e.g., the smallest within a group of dolls is the heaviest) that 
the seven-year-old participants, but not the four-year-old participants, seized the 
opportunity to gather empirical evidence for confirmation (Ronfard et al., 2018).  
 In the current investigation’s behavioral attribution task, regardless of whether 
the individual chose to verify, each statement made corresponding to their previously 
expressed curiosity was reflective of a plausible reality. For instance, one item 
describes an individual who walks by a classroom and wondered what the class was 
doing. After looking or not looking inside the classroom, this individual “said” that 
the class was reading. Because such a statement is likely consistent with children’s 
existing intuitions, it is possible that children perceived whether or not the individual 
verified that the class was in fact reading as inconsequential to whether or not it was 
an accurate piece of information. That is, despite being unverified, for instance, 
children could perceive a statement regarding students that are reading inside a 
classroom as likely a true representation of reality. As Ronfard et al.’s (2018) findings 





given claim, children tend to accept intuitive assertions at face-value. In turn, children 
may not have perceived individuals’ unverified claims in the presented behavioral 
attribution scenarios as disconcerting based on the intuitive nature of their content.  
 If scenarios were to describe individuals making claims that are surprising or 
inconsistent with previous experiences, it is possible that participants may have been 
more inclined to view the individual’s choice to verify or not to verify in a positive or 
negative light. However, such scenarios would test whether children ascribe social 
value to one’s choice to verify a claim based on the intuitiveness of its content; this 
would not address the central questions of this investigation. The current studies’ 
main focus was to explore whether young children perceive some extent of social 
value in individuals’ choice to verify the claims they make to others. Children’s 
attributions must therefore be solely based on the individual’s choice of whether or 
not they gather evidence to justify their assertion, irrespective of the nature of its 
content.  
Further, one of the theoretical perspectives guiding this investigation was the 
potential normative dimension of children’s reasoning about the reliability of 
empirical claims. That is, perhaps children hold an expectation of an informant’s 
epistemic certainty when making an assertion. The current studies failed to provide 
more insight in respect to this possibility as individuals described in the behavioral 
attribution task scenarios never made clear assertions. Nevertheless, if children expect 
an informant’s adherence to such a norm, then it is not likely selectively prescribed to 
contexts in which counterintuitive claims are made. If this were in fact the case, then 





norm for making assertions, as this would encompass all forms of empirical claims, 
whether they are intuitive or not.  
5.5 The Choice to Verify as Dispositional 
An individual’s choice to verify the claims they make to others can be 
interpreted as their self-designated responsibility to provide accurate information and 
to serve as a reliable epistemic source to others. In line with this view, one could 
characterize a verified claim as an honest one. In Li et al.’s (2014) study, children 
ages three to five were presented with two informants, each introduced using a trait-
label (i.e., honest or dishonest). Participants were also presented with a behavioral 
example that illustrated each trait-label. Li et al.’s (2014) findings show that only the 
oldest participants at five years of age, demonstrate a systematic trust in those who 
were honest.  
The current studies did not aim to determine whether young children infer 
one’s choice to verify the information they share with others as an honest act. 
However, it is possible that children may be inclined to believe so under specific 
circumstances—such as interpersonal situations in which an informant’s active choice 
to verify or not to verify their assertion is clearly illustrated. Although young children 
may understand honesty as an informative trait-label in determining whom to trust 
(e.g., Li, Heyman, & Xu, 2014), it is not clear if they are likely to perceive one’s 
choice to verify information as indicative of their honesty. In the current studies, it 
would require several steps in children’s cognitive process for attributions of verified 





behaviors to group members. Children would have to independently infer honesty or 
deception based on the individual’s evidentiary practices. This seems unlikely as 
young children have more difficulty with making such inferences in deciding whom 
to trust (e.g., Vanderbilt, Heyman, & Lieu, 2014), an arguably simpler task than 
making behavioral attributions.  
Conclusion 
The fact that there are myriad potential cases in which it is difficult or 
impossible for an individual to directly assess the accuracy of an empirical claim does 
not suggest that we should succumb to generally accepting all claims that we 
ourselves cannot directly verify, nor does it mean that we should regard them as 
unreliable. Not only would individuals’ cognitive development be limited but, at a 
much broader level, scientific progress would stagnate if either of these approaches 
were to be culturally adopted. Instead, children and adults alike must develop and 
appropriately apply strategies for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable 
sources.  
In promoting the development of scientific thinking, we must further 
emphasize critically thinking about the role social motivations play in selecting 
information sources. Individuals need to select their sources based on assumptions of 
whom they should trust in providing accurate and reliable information. It is essential 
that we therefore gain a deeper understanding of the potential influence social-biases 
have on individuals’ ability to effectively apply skeptical habits of mind when 





Potential avenues for future work in developing a more appropriate empirical 
test to answer the current investigation’s central questions have been outlined. We 
have yet to fully address at what point in development, if at all, children perceive 
some extent of social value in individuals’ choice to verify the information they plan 
to communicate to others. When we don’t have an opportunity to evaluate the source 
or process by which a claim is founded upon, it is that much more important that we 
practice introspection, so as to not to justify our trust in a source based on an assumed 
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